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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The object of this study is to compare the 
cooperative behaviour of Maori and European children 
and to investigate and compare the effects, upon the 
performance of the two ethnic groups, of working 
under cooperative conditions and under competitive 
conditions. Certain differences are expected to 
exist between the two ethnic groups as a result of 
the different child rearing practices employed by 
the Maoris and by the Europeans. 
The Beagleholes (1 946) described the Maori 
character as " ••• a generous, friendly, co-operative 
giver, one who always inclines to give back more than 
he receives." (Beaglehole and Beaglehole, 1 946, 
p. 1 43) . They also write that 11 • • •  while the Maori 
works extremely hard and very industriously when 
working in and for a co-operative group, he is 
characteristically without individual economic fore­
thought and thriftiness, somewhat irresponsible 
according to pakeha ideas, and a spendthrift, ••• 
one who works casually or in spurts when working 
for himself, •••" (Beaglehole and Beaglehole, 1 946, 
p. 1 46). Joan Metge (1 967) also subscribe� to this 
view of the Maori as cooperatively oriented and 
performing better in a cooperative group situation. 
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In  relation to sport, for example, 11 • • •  Maoris show 
a decided preference for sports which involve team 
practice ••• They work best in a team ••• 11 (Metge, 
1 967, p. 1 41 ) ,  and Metge refers to 11 • • •  the typically 
Maori enjoyment of group action toward a new goal." 
(Metge, 1 967, p. 1 1 0) .  
The Rakau studies (Earle, 1 958; James Ritchie, 
1 956; Jane Ritchie, 1 957) found that there was a 
basic Maori child rearing pattern that clearly 
differed from the European pattern - these findings 
are supported by similar results from the work of the 
Beagleholes (1 946) in Kowhai and Joan Mage's work in 
Kotara and Auckland between 1 953 and 1 958. That is, 
the pattern, which is a result of the Maori tendency 
to have large families, the depressed economic condi­
tions and the traditional attitudes and practices, 
seems to be typical for most Maori families. 
The basic pattern of Maori child rearing involves 
a "golden world of love and affection" (Beaglehole and 
Beaglehole, 1 946, p.1 44) for the first few years of 
life. During these early years the child is the 
centre of attention and gets what he wants, when he 
wants it, and receives as much affectionate attention 
as he desires. The mother takes her baby with her 
to any social events, and once there the baby is 
passed around to be cuddled and nursed. 
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However, this period of the child's life soon 
comes to an end, usually when another baby arrives, 
the mother then devoting most of her time to the new 
baby. The toddler is not completely ignored by the 
mother as soon as the new baby arrives. Rather the 
new baby is now the centre of attention and his wants 
and needs are satisfied before the mother will attend 
to the toddler, who consequently receives considerably 
less love and attention from the mother than previous­
ly. 
The Beagleholes (1946) found that in Kowhai 
this rejection occurred when the child was three or 
four years old, but in Rakau the change took place 
when the child was two or three - Ritchie (1956) 
attributes this difference in the age at which rejec­
tion occurs to the more rapid rate of population 
increase in Rakau. Ritchie (1956) further points 
out that this rejection is not objectively severe but 
is severe only when compared with the affection and 
attention the child receives prior to the rejection. 
The significance of the rejection is due to its 
suddenness and contrast to the previous experiences 
of the child. 
Following this rejection, the child changes 
from "••• the familiar smiling child • • •  into a 
weeping, ailing child •••" (Ritchie, 1956, p. 39) 
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and as such constitutes a nuisance around the home. 
The mother deals with this problem by assigning the 
child to the care of one of his older siblings. Thus, 
following the rejection phase, the child becomes pro­
gressively more independent of his mother, at the same 
time becoming more dependent on substitute gratifica-
tions provided by siblings and peers. There are a 
few children who are able to win parental attention 
and approval by behaving in such a way that they 
keep parents and visitors amused, but the majority 
of the children regain security by associating with 
their peers and siblings. 
Ritchie (1956) explains that this rejection is 
not limited to Maori society but occurs in all 
societies as part of the growing-up process. There 
is a difference, however, in that the independence 
from his parents that the young Maori child achieves 
is not experienced by a child in European society 
until the individual has reached late adolescence at 
which time the individual is"••• considerably better 
equipped to withstand it �ndependence] ••• " (Ritchie, 
1 956, p. 39) . 
During his middle-years (approximately six to 
thirteen years of age) the Maori child is not closely 
involved with the family group and tends to remain 
in the home only as long as it is necessary for him 
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to complete his allotted tasks - only the older 
children have any responsibility placed upon them, 
the younger children generally working for someone 
else and not receiving any reward or satisfaction 
and therefore wanting to simply finish the task as 
quickly as possible and get away. The middle-years 
children do attend organised social activities, but 
they have very little contact, if any, with their 
parents once they have arrived at these activities. 
Margaret Earle (1 958) found that the parents have a 
general interest in their middle-years children but 
are not interested in them individually and there 
is "••• no close and intimate contact between parent 
and child during this period. " (Earle, 1 958, p. 20) . 
The capriciousness of the behaviour of the parents 
towards the children - reward and punishment depend­
ing upon the parent's mood rather than the behaviour 
of the child - encourages the children to spend as 
much time as possible out of their parents' way and 
the middle-years children consequently prefer to 
spend their time with their peer group. 
Margaret Earle ( 1958) found that in the play 
groups of the middle-years children the standards of 
behaviour were largely determined by the children 
themselves. Positively valued behaviours were 
kindness, sharing, cooperation and friendliness, 
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while behaviours such as aggression were negatively 
valued. The play groups tended to be large and close-
knit, providing a situation in which members receive 
mutual support and a certain degree of security. 
Only a limited degree of security is achieved, however, 
as some threat of rejection is still present, result­
ing in caution, a lack of real trust, and the expecta­
tion of further rejection. Defences against this 
possible rejection develop, one of them being non­
achievement in Maori social situations. 
The Maori's need for love and approval following 
his rejection inhibits the development of any strong 
drive for personal achievement. Being better than 
or different from the group leads to criticism from 
other group members. Margaret Earle (1 958) found 
that those children who set their aspirations at a 
level that the rest of the group considered to be 
too high were "••• cut down to size by their friends, 
(Earle, 1 958, p. 28) . The Maori child consequently 
learns to limit his achievement to levels acceptable 
to the group. Ausubel (1 961)  mentions the importance 
that Maori culture attaches to status acquired from 
group psychological support and membership in and 
acceptance by the group. This emphasis results in 
II • • •  
a lower level of need for personal achievement in / 
Maori culture than is found in Western civilisation. 
The Maori feels less need than the European to 
demonstrate his value through performance because, 
unlike the European, his status is not derived from 
his performance. 
Gang membership during the middle-years is 
important to both Maori and European children. 
There is a difference, however, in that the European 
child of this age, while being a member of such peer 
groups, also has a close association with his family, 
a closer association than that experienced by the 
Maori child. Although the European child spends 
some of his time outside the home, much of his time 
is spent within the home environment or else within 
hearing distance of the mother. For the European 
child "••• first loyalty, first identification and 
first reference group, continues to be the family." 
(James Ritchie, 1 956, p.43) whereas in the case of 
the Maori child the family comes second, as the de­
pendence of the middle-years Maori child is centered 
upon his peer-group and he is largely independent of 
his home. 
Jane and James Ritchie (1 970) found that, 
contrary to expectations arising from the Rakau 
studies, there was no indication that the three 
groups of Maori mothers in their study - those 
living in the pa, those in the small town, and those 
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in the city - showed an earlier and more severe 
inhibition of dependency than the European groups -
rural, small town, and city. However, they do not 
view this as necessarily indicating that the pattern 
does not exist, as the Maori mothers, especially 
those living in the pa, were unable to understand 
the questions asked relating to dependency. The 
Ritchies found that although they themselves had 
seen Maori children acting dependently, the mothers 
did not perceive this behaviour as a problem but 
rather as a behaviour that is best ignored. The 
Maori child in the pa or small town tended to protest 
if the mother went away, whereas for the children in 
the other groups the departure of the mother for a 
short while constituted no great problem, very little 
protest at all occurring in 64% of these cases 
(Ritchie and Ritchie, 1 970, p.69). 
The Maori mothers in the small town live in a 
different situation from those in the pa in that 
they are no longer surrounded by relations upon whom 
they can depend. However, the Ritchies found that 
the small town Maori mother remains Maori in her 
child rearing methods because she lacks a technique 
by which she can change "••• the psychological 
stance of the child when he assumes an independence 
she has in fact encouraged him to take." (Jane and 
James Ritchie, 1 970, p.1 42). The Maori mothers 
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in the city differed from those in the pa and the 
small town, their methods tending to be indistinguish­
able from the European child rearing patterns except 
in very minor respects. There were still some aspects 
of the Maori child rearing pattern which had per­
sisted and which were occasionally apparent. This 
tendency to move away from the traditional child 
rearing pattern as one moves from the pa, to the 
small town, and then to the city suggests that 
where the family is living in a city and not in a 
Maori community, it is possible that the differences 
between Maori and European children with regard to 
cooperation will be less than the differences 
between the two ethnic groups living in the other 
areas. 
Despite this tendency towards a more European 
pattern of child rearing, the Ritchies (1970) con­
clude that there is a distinct Maori child rearing 
pattern which, although changing, is not doing so 
solely in the direction of the European pattern. 
Research in Hawaii (Howard, 1969) found a very 
similar child rearing pattern among the Hawaiians 
to that of the Maoris in the Rakau studies: "By 
the time these children reach the intermediate 
grades (4th on up) they have learned to care little 
about adult approval. Instead they are very much 
concerned for their relations with peers, who have 
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become their main source of interpersonal satisfac­
tion. " (Howard, 1969, p. 8) . The parallel with the 
Maori child rearing pattern lies in the tendency for 
the Maori child to associate with his peers and 
brothers and sisters in preference to his parents, 
whom he avoids as much as possible, and thus to de­
velop a similar dependence on his peers to that of 
the Hawaiian child, resulting in a concern with re­
lationships with peers rather than with relationships 
with parents. Howard (1969) mentions that one 
frequent consequence in Hawaii of this situation is 
that "••• the competitive framework upon which our 
school system is based operates in reverse. When 
children are asked to compete for various forms of 
approval they are essentially being asked to opt for 
their relationship to the teacher against their 
fellow students, but for Hawaiian children peer 
approval is more important and the competitive struc­
ture tends to inhibit performance. " (Howard, 1969, 
p. 8). A similar situation may be expected to exist 
with Maori children in New Zealand. As a result of 
the tendency for the Maori child to be more dependent 
on his peer group than the European child for whom 
the family is still an important provider of security, 
it is expected that the Maori child would be more 
cooperatively oriented, and perform better under 
; 
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cooperative conditions than under competitive 
conditions. This does not imply that European 
children are not cooperatively oriented but that 
the degree of cooperative behaviour is greater in 
the Maori child, and that the difference in perform­
ance under cooperative and competitive conditions is 
expected to show a greater improvement under the 
cooperative condition for the Maori child than for 
the European child. 
Further theoretical support for the anticipated 
differences is provided by the non-achievement moti­
vation that peer dependency produces in the Maori 
child and the emphasis in Maori culture upon status 
derived from group membership. The European child, 
brought up in a more individualistic and more per­
sonal-achievement oriented society, is at liberty 
to strive for personal achievement and would there­
fore be expected to behave less cooperatively than 
the Maori child. 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be investigated in this study 
can therefore be stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 :  That Maori children will perform 
significantly better in a co­
operative social situation than 
in a competitive social situa­
tion. 
1 2. 
Hypothesis 2: That performance of the Maori 
children will be significantly 
better in a cooperative social 
situation as opposed to a compe­
titive social situation than 
will the performance of the 
European children. 
Hypothesis 3: That Maori children will exhibit 
a significantly greater level of 
cooperative behaviour than 
European children. 
CHAPTER 2 
SELECTION OF INSTRUMENTS 
There have been no other studies conducted com­
paring the cooperative behaviour of Maoris and 
Europeans. Therefore, the studies to be mentioned 
in this section, which were mainly conducted in the 
United States of America, are of interest principal­
ly for their methodology, and the specific results 
of  each study will only be mentioned if the results 
are relevant to the methodological aspects under 
consideration. 
Definition of terms 
In the present study the definitions of 
cooperation and competition adopted were those 
proposed by Deutsch (1 950) who, in line with other 
social theorists (May and Doob, 1 937; Mead, 1 937; 
Mall�r, 1 929) , perceives the major difference 
between the two social situations to be in the nature 
of the goal-regions. In a cooperative social situa-
tion the goals of the people concerned are "promotive­
ly interdependent" (Deutsch, 1 950, p.1 32) - that is, 
' ••• a goal-region can be entered (to some degree) 
by any given individual or sub-unit only if all the 
individuals or sub-units under consideration can 
also enter their respective goal-regions (to some 
degree) . "  (Deutsch, 1 950, p.1 32) . In a competi-
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tive social situation, on the other hand, the goals 
are "contriently interdependent" (Deutsch, 1 950, 
p. 1 32) and "••• if a goal-region is entered by any 
individual or sub-unit ••• the other individuals or 
sub-units will, to some degree, be unable to reach 
their respective goals •••" (Deutsch, 1950, p.1 32) . 
That is, in a cooperative social situation 
either all those involved achieve their goals or no 
one does, whereas in a competitive situation only 
one individual can achieve his goal, his goal 
achievement precluding the possibility of the other 
individuals involved reaching their goals. 
From this, a person can be said to be cooperating 
or cooperative when he acts to achieve his own goal 
in such a way as to enable others to achieve their 
goals as well. Correspondingly, a person is compet­
ing or competitive if his goal-directed behaviour is 
such that others are prevented from attaining their 
goals if he achieves his. 
Measure of performance 
Only one study has been conducted comparing 
performance under cooperative and competitive condi­
tions between different groups (Madsen, 1 967). 
Madsen (1 967) used a task consisting of a sheet of 
paper containing 1 76 X's and the subjects were re­
quired to draw circles around as many X's as they 
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could in two minutes. In the competitive condition 
the child who circled the most X's received a piece 
of candy and their partner - the children worked in 
pairs - received none. In the cooperative condi-
tion each subject was asked to work for his partner 
and each child received candy according to the number 
of X's circled by his partner. 
Many other studies have been carried out compar­
ing the differential effects of cooperative and com­
petitive social situations upon performance, but these 
have not compared different populations. Several of 
them (Whittemore, 1 924; Bruning et al, 1 966; Huddle, 
1 967; Teasdale and Joynt, 1 967) have compared per­
formance on tasks involving motor abilities. In the 
present study it was considered preferable to consider 
the performance of subjects on some task relevant to 
their school life as the obtained results would then 
have greater applicability to education. The findings 
reported by Howard (1 969) suggest that the Maori child 
might be at a disadvantage in a competitive grading 
system. 
Several studies have compared performance under 
cooperative and competitive conditions in an educational 
setting. Deutsch (1 951) and Haines and McKeachie 
(1 967), working with college students over one term of 
the college year, compared performance in discussion 
16. 
situations where either all received the same grade 
according to the group's performance, or the subjects 
were compared and ranked within their groups. This 
was not possible in the present situation, firstly 
because of the age of the subjects, and secondly 
because of the lack of time which made it necessary· 
that a measure of performance be obtained at one 
session. 
As there were no tasks suitable for the present 
study available, a task was constructed similar to 
that used by Hurlock (1 927) for a comparison of the 
effect of group rivalry upon performance - Hurlock 
(1 927) used sets of addition arithmetic problems. 
In the present study sets of subtraction equations 
were constructed. This type of task was readily 
amenable to comparison of performance in cooperative 
and competitive conditions and was also relevant to 
the school situation. 
Measurement of cooperative orientation 
Several studies have investigated differences 
in cooperative orientation across cultural groups 
or between subgroups within a culture. In these 
studies a numerical measure of the level of coopera­
tion displayed has been obtained by either one of 
two methods - the Madsen Cooperation Board or a 
version of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
The first of these, the Madsen Cooperation 
Board, was developed by Madsen (1 967) for use in a 
study of children in three Mexican sub-cultures. 
The Board consists of a square with one eyelet at 
each corner and strings which are threaded through 
each eyelet and connected to a metal weight in the 
centre which holds a ball-point pen. For each 
trial, a sheet of paper with circles drawn at the 
midpoints of the sides is placed on the Board and 
the task requires the subjects to draw a line through 
the circles. An individual child can only pull the 
pen towards himself and, as the circles are not 
directly in front of the subjects, cooperation is 
required for the children to perform the task. 
Madsen (1 967) worked with groups of  four children, 
one child positioned at each corner of the Board, and 
with four circles on the sheets of paper. Madsen 
(1 967) induced a cooperative orientation and then a 
competitive orientation in her subjects by telling 
the subjects in the first half of the experiment that 
if the circles were crossed in a set order each sub­
ject would be rewarded and, in the second half, giving 
instructions to the effect that each subject would be 
rewarded for the number of times the pen crossed the 
circle to his right. 
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The Madsen Cooperation Board has also been 
employed by Nelson and Madsen (1969) in their study 
of Negro and Caucasion four-year-olds and by Shapira 
and Madsen (1969) in their study of kibbutz and urban 
children in Israel. In both of these studies the 
groups worked under both cooperative and competitive 
conditions, established by instructions indicating 
group reward (where all receive a reward or none do) 
and individual reward (where only one person receives 
a prize) respectively. 
The procedure in these three experiments was 
to compare the amount of cooperation exhibited by 
the two groups in the cooperative and competitive 
situations. Madsen (1967) , for example, found that 
the urban middle-class children exhibited a greater 
level of competitive motivation under both orienta­
tion conditions than either the urban poor or the 
rural groups. 
A disadvantage of the Madsen Cooperation Board 
is that scores are obtained only for each group as 
a whole and not for individual members in each group. 
This was felt to be a disadvantage of the Board in 
relation to the present study as the effect of groups 
of Maori and European children working together was 
also of interest. Sibley, Senn and Epanchin's (1968) 
work with Negro and white adolescents suggests that 
1 9. 
heterogeneous groups show a lower level of coopera-
tion that homogeneous groups. Sibley et al (1 968) 
found a small but consistent difference between 
heterogeneous and homogeneous groups in that when 
subjects were paired with a partner of a different 
race they were less cooperative than when they were 
paired with someone of the same race as themselves. 
Harford and Cutter (1 966),however, found that 
although the level of cooperation decreased from Game 
1 (homogeneous dyads) to Game 2 (heterogeneous dyads) 
the level also decreased when subjects played both 
games with a partner of the same race. That is, 
there was a significant decrease in the level of 
cooperation over the two games regardless of whether 
the dyads in the second game were homogeneous or 
mixed. The decrease in level was therefore not 
necessarily due to the fact that the subject was 
playing a partner of a different race - the decrease 
could have been merely an order effect due to ex­
perience. However, Sibley, Senn and Epanchin 
(1 968) controlled for order effects by having half 
the subjects play first in a mixed dyad and half 
play first in a homogeneous dyad and thus their 
finding that subjects exhibited less cooperation in 
mixed dyads than in homogeneous dyads cannot be 
attributed to experience. As it was considered 
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worthwhile to investigate cooperation of Maori and 
European children for same and mixed race d'yads, it 
was necessary to have individual scores for the Maori 
and the European subjects under both conditions and 
the Madsen Cooperation Board was inappropriate. 
The rationale behind the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game (PDG), the second method of measuring coopera-
tion, can be most easily understood from considera-
tion of the prisoner's dilemma interpretation of the 
game: 
Two suspects are taken into custody and 
separated. The district attorney is certain 
that they are guilty of a specific crime, but 
he does not have adequate evidence to convict 
them at a trial. He points out to each 
prisoner that each has two alternatives: to 
confess the crime the police are sure they 
have done, or not to confess. If they both 
do not confess, then the district attorney 
states he will book them on some very minor 
trumped-up charge such as petty larceny and 
illegal possession of a weapon, and they will 
both receive minor punishment; if they both 
confess they will be prosecuted, but he will 
recommend less than the most severe sentence; 
but if one confesses and the other does not, 
then the confessor will receive lenient treat­
ment for turning state's evidence, whereas the 
latter will get "the book" alapped at him • ••• 
The problem for each prisoner is to decide 
whether to confess or not. (Luce and Raiffa, 
1 957, p. 95). 
J 
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The PDG is an example of a non-zero-sum (or 
mixed motive) game - that is, it is a game in which 
one player's gain is not necessarily, or always, the 
other player's loss, and it is possible for both 
players to gain on a particular trial or for both to 
lose. In the theory of non-zero-sum games the PDG 
is a noncooperative game in that no communication 
is permitted between the players for them to work out 
a strategy. 
The payoff matrix for the PDG is as follows: 
where A
1 
represents a cooperative choice by player A 
and B
1 
represents a cooperative choice by player B, and 
A2 
and B
2 represent defecting choices by players A and 
B respectively. x
1
, x
2
, x3 
and x
4 
represent the pay-
offs to subjects A and B resulting from their choices 
whether to act cooperatively or not, the payoff to 
subject A being given first in each bracketed pair. 
The values of the payoff matrix are subject to the 
following conditions: 
i) 2x1 > x2 + x3> 2x4 
ii) x
3> 
x
1 
iii) x
3 
> x
2 
iv) X4 > x2 
(Rapoport and Orwant, 1962, p. 5) 
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The main feature of the PDG is that for both players 
strategy 2 (the defecting choice which represents a 
refusal to cooperate) dominates strategy 1 (the co­
operative choice), A
2 
dominating A
1 
for the row 
player and B
2 
dominating B
1 
for the column player, 
as x3 is the highest payoff value. However, if 
both players select strategy 2 then their individual 
payoffs are less than their payoffs if they both 
chose strategy 1 ,  as x
4 
is smaller than x
1
• 
Rapoport and Orwant (1 962) mention two studies 
by Deutsch (1 958, 1 960a) which s how that behaviour 
in the PDG is a function of personality factors. 
Deutsch (1 958, 1 960a) induced, by instructions, 
either one of three motivational orientations in 
his subjects - cooperative, the subjects being told 
to consider themselves as partners and to be inter­
ested in the other ' s  payoff as well as their own; 
individualistic, in which the subjects were told 
that their only motivation was to win as much money 
for themselves as possible, and that the game was 
not a competitive one; and competitive, in which 
the subjects were told that they were to win as much 
money for themselves as possible and also to do 
better than their partner. He found that there was 
a strong correlation between the motivation given to 
the subjects and their behaviour in the PDG. Deutsch 
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(1960b) also conducted an experiment in which he did 
not induce any specific orientation in the subjects -
he found that the subjects• game behaviour correlated 
highly with the subjects• scores on the F scale in 
that most subjects who made trusting and trustworthy 
scores in the PDG had relatively low scores in the 
F Scale, whereas those with high scores on the F 
Scale tended to make suspicious and untrustworthy 
choices. Rapoport and Orwant concluded that "••• 
behavior on the Prisoner's Dilemma type game is a 
function of personality factors, whether induced by 
giving the subjects motivational orientations or 
giving them none, in which case they supply their 
own, ••• It seems that in this type of game where 
"rationality" prescribes no precise strategy, the 
individual's motivation, whether inherent or induced, 
determines his strategy." (Rapoport and Orwant, 1962, 
p. 17). It therefore appears valid to use the number 
of cooperative responses in the PDG as a measure of 
cooperative orientation. 
A version of the PDG was used by Sampson and 
Kardush (1965) and Harford and Cutter (1966) in com­
parative studies of Negro and white boys and girls. 
Harford and Cutter (1966) worked with integrated, 
ethnically mixed dyads and with ethnically homogeneous, 
segregated dyads. In analysing the data they obtained, 
24. 
individual scores were used - that is, the amount 
of cooperation for each individual subject. 
Sibley, Senn and Epanchin (1 968) investigated 
the cooperative behaviour of Negro and white adolescents 
in a fifty-trial PDG. The dyads were asked to try and 
gain as many points as possible, and the data analysed 
by Sibley et al (1 968) , like that of Harford and Cutter 
(1 966) , consisted of the number of cooperative responses 
made by each subject. 
Meeker (1 970), in a study of a West African tribe, 
used two types of two-person mixed motive games - the 
PDG and the Maximising Difference Game. In the Maxi­
mising Difference Game (MDG), which is a modification 
of the PDG developed by McClintock and McNeel (1 966, 
1 967) , a non-cooperative choice (which may be called 
competitive rather than defective as in the PDG) gives 
the subject a higher score than that of his opponent 
but at the same time lowers his absolute score. 
Consequently, competition in the MDG is attributable 
to a wish to win relative to someone else, whereas in 
the PDG a non-cooperative choice can also be motivated by 
a desire to win as much as possible for oneself. 
In  the present study, the PDG was selected as 
the instrument for the measurement of cooperative 
tendency rather than the Madsen Cooperation Board 
or the MDG. The Madsen Cooperation Board was re­
jected for the reason mentioned earlier - that 
individual scores are not readily obtainable - and 
the MDG was rejected because the present study is 
concerned with cooperative orientation rather than 
competitive orientation. In the MDG, if the subject 
wishes to maximise his payoff he will choose the co­
operative strategy and a cooperative choice can 
therefore be based on either a desire to cooperate 
and/or a desire to maximise one's gain. The PDG, 
in which a cooperative choice does not necessarily 
maximise one's potential gain (more can be gained by 
a successful non-cooperative choice) does not have 
this confounding variable in the cooperative response 
and therefore is a purer measure of cooperation. 
The MDG, on the other hand, is a purer measure of 
competitive orientation as it eliminates the confound­
ing variable of maximisation of gain from a competi-
tive choice. Cooperation and competition are not 
necessarily opposites: non-cooperation does not 
necessarily imply competition nor does non-competition 
necessarily imply cooperation, and as the focus of 
this study is the cooperative orientation of the 
Maori and the European child, the PDG was selected 
as being the most suitable method for measuring the 
degree of cooperative orientation. 
Rapoport and Chammah (1965) found that inter­
action effects in the PDG were very strong and tended 
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to make the members of a dyad behave like each other, 
the interaction thus having a strong effect on the 
total relative frequency of the cooperative responses 
in each game. They assumed that to the extent that 
the populations being compared are playing the game 
under identical conditions the differences in the 
total frequency of cooperation between the popula­
tions reflect a difference in s ome characteristic of 
the populations, whether the characteristic resides 
inherently in individuals in the population or in 
the way the individuals interact. Rapoport and 
Chammah (1965) therefore decided to evaluate per­
formance in the PDG in the same way as it had been 
evaluated in previous studies - that is, in terms of 
the observed number of cooperative responses. 
However, unlike other studies, Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965) took the dyad, rather than the individual, 
as the unit of population because of the interaction 
effects. The work of Rapoport and Chammah (1965) 
suggests that the scores of dyads would be preferable 
to the scores of individuals as data. In the present 
study, however, individual scores will be considered 
when the effect upon performance of being a member of 
a mixed dyad as compared to a homogeneous dyad is 
investigated. The work of Sibley, Senn and Epanchin 
(1 968) suggests that it is reasonable to expect that 
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there will be an overall decrease in the level of 
cooperation in the dyads. As the interaction with-
in a dyad has an important effect upon the responses 
of the two players (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), it 
is reasonable to expect that as a result of the inter­
action the players involved will reach a compromise 
in the level of cooperation exhibited. That is, as 
the European child is expected to be less cooperative 
than the Maori child, a Maori child will find that 
his partner is less cooperative when he is playing 
with a European child than when he is playing with 
a Maori child. Consequently, the Maori child's co-
operative responses in a mixed dyad will be less 
frequently matched by a cooperative response from 
the subject's partner than in a homogeneous dyad, 
and should thus be more frequently punished by a 
defecting response from the partner, in which case 
the partner gains while the Maori subject loses. 
As a result, the Maori subject is likely to stop 
giving cooperative responses. It is anticipated 
that this will result in a decrease in the amount of 
cooperation exhibited by the Maori subject in a 
heterogeneous dyad as compared to a homogeneous dyad. 
In the case of the European child, the converse is 
expected. A cooperative response by the European 
subject will be less frequently punished by a defect-
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ing response from the subject's partner when the sub­
ject is playing with a Maori child than with a Euro­
pean child, the former being expected to give coopera-
tive responses more frequently. As the cooperative 
responses will therefore be rewarded by a cooperative 
response from the subject's partner more frequently 
than when the European child is playing in a homo­
geneous dyad, it is anticipated that the European 
child will exhibit more cooperative responses when 
playing in a mixed dyad than when playing in a homo­
geneous dyad. 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses proposed at the conclusion of 
Chapter 1 are operationally defined as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 :  That Maori children will obtain 
significantly higher scores on 
the performance task under co­
operative conditions than under 
competitive conditions. 
Hypothesis 2: That Maori children will show 
a significantly higher positive 
difference between cooperative 
and competitive condition per­
formance scores than will Euro­
pean children. 
Hypothesis 3: 
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That Maori children will make 
a significantly higher number 
of strategy 1 choices (coopera­
tive choices) in the PDG than 
will the European children. 
The additional hypotheses concerning cooperative 
behaviour in mi�ed and homogeneous dyads proposed in 
this chapter are stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: That Maori children in hetero­
geneous dyads will make signi­
ficantly fewer cooperative 
choices in the PDG than will 
Maori children in homogeneous 
dyads. 
Hypothesis 5: That European children in hetero-
geneous dyads will make a signi­
ficantly greater number of 
cooperative choices in the PDG 
than will European children in 
homogeneous dyads. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The sample consisted of 1 23 school children 
from 4 primary schools in the Waikato basin between 
the ages of seven-and-a-half and eight-and-a-half 
years as at 1 January 1 971 . The composition of the 
sample according to ethnic origin and sex is given 
in Table 1 .  
The majority of the subjects took part in one 
game of the PDG and in the performance section of the 
experiment, but some subjects only participated in 
one section, either because of absenteeism or because 
their results had to be eliminated for reasons that 
will be given later. 
Table 1 .  Classification o f  Sample by Ethnic 
Origin and Sex 
Maori* European 
Male 25 37 62 
Female 28 33 61 
Total 53 70 1 23 
*a child was classified as a Maori 
if both parents were Maori 
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Performance measure 
For the performance measure, two sets of 30 
mathematical problems, subtraction equations, were 
developed. The equations were of increasing diffi­
culty and a time limit of five minutes was imposed, 
so that while all subjects would be able to attempt 
some of the equations, few would be able to solve all 
30 equations correctly. There was a tendency among 
some subjects, after they had solved as many as they 
could, to hurry on and randomly answer the remaining 
equations, but as the number of equations the subjects 
answered correctly was used as the performance measure, 
this tendency did not seriously affect results. 
The equations were constructed in pairs of two 
equations of similar difficulty. The degree of 
difficulty within the pairs was controlled by construc­
ting two equations of the same form - for example, two­
figure-two-figure, decomposition, lower decade being 
one. Once the pairs of equations had been construc­
ted, one of each pair was randomly assigned to set 
A and the other to set B. 
The two sets of equations were administered, 
without orientation instructions but with the time 
limit, to 25 seven-and-a-half to eight-and-a-half 
year olds, twelve Maoris and thirteen Europeans. 
Fourteen children were given set A first and then 
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set B, and eleven were given set B first and then set 
A. A two factor analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on the second factor was applied to the data 
to test for order effects and whether the two sets of 
problems were sufficiently similar for them to be re-
garded as comparable. Table 2, which gives the re-
sults of this analysis, indicates that there were no 
significant differences in performance on the problems 
resulting from the order of administration nor were 
there any significant differences between the two 
sets of problems. The two sets of problems can 
therefore be used to compare the performance of 
Table 2. Analysis of Variance Table for 
Order Effects and Comparability 
of Sets of Problems 
Source of SS df MS F variation 
Between subjs 24 
A (order) 0.01 1 0. 01 0. 00008 n. s. 
Subjs w. groups 3062. 27 23 133. 14 
Within subjs 
B (set) 0. 22 1 0. 22 o .o4 n. s. 
AB 0. 62 1 0. 62 0. 12 n. s. 
B x subjs w .  116. 06 23 5. 05 
groups 
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subjects under cooperative and competitive conditions. 
Although the statistical analysis showed no 
order effects, the order of administration of the 
two sets of problems and the order of the orientation 
induced by instructions was controlled as much as 
possible. There were four possible combinations of 
order of administration of the sets of problems and 
of the instructions: cooperative instructions for 
s et A followed by competitive instructions for set 
B; cooperative instructions for set B followed by 
competitive instructions for set A; competitive in­
structions for set A followed by cooperative instruc­
tions for set B; and competitive instructions for 
set B followed by cooperative instructions for set A. 
Subjects were randomly allocated to groups of five, 
six or seven, the size of the groups depending upon 
the number of subjects available at each school. 
The groups were then randomly assigned to one of 
the four possible combinations of order of admini­
stration of set of problems and of instructions, 
with the limitation that an approximately equal num­
ber of subjects be assigned to each combination. 
The allocation was also limited by the ethnic compo­
sition required for the groups - Maori, European and 
mixed. The mixed composition was included to see 
if working in an ethnically mixed group had any 
effect upon performance. The final allocation of 
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subjects was as shown in Table 3. The distribution 
of subjects over the four combinations was not even, 
but this was unavoidable, s ince absenteeism, the 
fact that subjects had to be tested within their 
s chools, and the limitation of group ethnic composi-
tion, meant that it was very difficult to obtain an 
equal cell distribution. 
Each subject solved one set of problems under 
each of the two orientations, cooperation and competi-
tion. In this way, differences resulting from differ-
ential ability of subjects were eliminated. 
Table 3. Distribution of Subjects in Groups 
for Measurement of Performance 
Combination Maori European Mixed 
Maori Eur. 
coop - comp 
A - B 6 10 1 5 22 
coop - comp 
B - A 8 11 5 2 26 
comp - coop 
A - B 8 9 5 6 28 
comp - coop 
- A 10 9 3 6 28 
Total 32 39 14 19 104 
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Prisoner's Dilemma 
For the PDG the subjects were randomly assigned 
to dyads within the limits imposed by the required 
ethnic composition of the dyads. There were 42 
dyads altogether, 18  where both subjects were Euro­
pean, 1 1  where both were Maori, and 1 3  mixed dyads 
where one subject was Maori and the other was Euro­
pean. This is the number of dyads actually used 
in the statistical analysis - other dyads were run 
but had to be discarded because one or more of the 
subjects could not understand the game situation. 
The randomisation was not complete as the subjects 
could only be randomly assigned to dyads within 
their schools and also the rate of absenteeism frequent­
ly meant that one subject of a dyad was away and a sub­
stitute had to be used. 
The apparatus for the PDG consisted of a table, 
two chairs, a screen, a bell, counters, three plates 
(one for each of the subjects and one for the experi­
menter) , and red and blue self-adhesive spots. The 
screen divided the table in half length-ways and pre­
vented the subjects, who were seated at either end 
of the table, from receiving visual cues from each 
other - although the subjects could not see each other 
while the PDG was in progress, they all knew who 
their partner was. The bell was used to indicate 
the commencement of each trial, and the counters, 
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kept in the plates, were used for scoring. The 
spots were used to help the children identify their 
left and right hands, a blue spot being placed on 
their left hands and a red spot on the subjects' 
right hands. 
The payoff matrix used for the PDG, which was 
the same as that used by Meeker (1 970) in her study 
of Kpelle tribesmen, is given in Table 4. The 
matrix satisfies the conditions for the PDG out-
lined in Chapter 2 (p.21 ).  A length of 50 trials 
per game was decided upon following a pilot study 
in which ten pairs played the PDG, five dyads with 
30 trials per game and five dyads with 50 trials per 
game. From inspection of the results obtained, a 
pattern of responding did not emerge until the 
latter part of the game and a 30-trial PDG was not 
of sufficient length for subjects to establish a 
pattern of responding. Therefore a length of 50 
trials, which allowed the dyads to establish a res-
ponse pattern, was selected. 
Table 4. Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game 
[
(+1 , + 1 )  
(+2, -2) 
( -2 ,  +2 )l 
( - 1 , - 1 )j 
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A trial by trial record was made for each dyad's 
game and, following the suggestion of Rapoport and 
Chammah (1 965), the number of cooperative responses 
was calculated for dyads rather than for individual 
subjects although the individual scores were calculated 
when the effect upon cooperation of a mixed dyad was 
considered. A subtype of cooperative response which 
will be considered was noticed in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma games conducted in the pilot study and in 
the games during the actual experiment - the response 
where a subject follows a defecting response by his 
partner on the previous trial with a cooperative 
response on the next trial. 
Procedure 
The majority of the children were taken from 
their classrooms twice, the first time for the 
measurement of performance and the second time for 
the measurement of cooperative tendency. It was 
considered preferable that the subjects played the 
PDG after they had been tested for performance under 
the two orientations as it would be more enjoyable 
for the children and would also yield a higher reward. 
They were rewarded for participating in both parts of 
the experiment but the reward was smaller in the per­
formance section. If the PDG had been played first 
the larger rewards could have meant that when the 
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children participated in the second part of the 
experiment and found that their possible rewards 
were smaller they would have been dissatisfied and 
possibly not have been as motivated to do well. 
Also, by conducting the PDG after the completion of 
the performance condition it was possible to tell 
the children that they would be wanted again to do 
something that was much more enjoyable for them, 
thus motivating them to be at school over the next 
few days and reduce the amount of absenteeism for 
the PDG part of the experiment. 
For the measurement of performance, in which 
each group of children was tested separately, the 
children were seated around a table and were given 
the following instructions: 
Do you know what equations are? I'm 
sure that you'll have done them in class. 
Have you? Good. The sort of equation I 
am going to give you here is one with two 
numbers and I want you to subtract one from 
the other, so one number is made less by the 
amount of the other number. Now, ••• 
Then, depending upon which condition the group 
was to work under first, either the instructions 
inducing a cooperative orientation or those inducing 
a competitive orientation were given. 
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Workie (1967) pointed out that it is not valid 
to compare groups where subjects are competing against 
each other with groups where subjects are cooperating 
together but competing against another group and label 
the latter condition as cooperative, saying that the 
results indicate the differences in performance under 
competitive and cooperative conditions. The latter 
condition obviously contains an element of competition. 
Consequently, in the instructions for the cooperative 
condition in the present experiment no reference was 
made to competition with other groups, the subjects 
being told merely that their group was to try and do 
as well as it could in an attempt to achieve a group 
total higher than a predicted total - that is, there 
was no sense of competing between groups introduced 
by the instructions. 
For the competitive condition the experimenter 
told the subjects: 
I've got a/another set of equations here. 
(This time) I want to see which one of you 
gets the most equations correct. I'm going 
to give you all the same lot of equations and 
I want to see how many of them each of you can 
solve correctly in five minutes. I'll be 
marking these equations and I'm going to see 
which one of you gets the most equations 
correct - the one who gets the most equations 
correct will win three lollies. 
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For the cooperative condition the following in-
structions were given: 
I'm going to give you all a/another lot 
of equations. (This time) I want to see how 
many e quations this group can solve correctly 
in five minutes .  I want you to solve the 
equations by yourselves, but after you've 
done them I'll be marking them and then adding 
up the number of equations the people in this 
group get correct all together, so I can see 
how well this group can do - if the number of 
equations you get correct between you is more 
than the number I expect this group to get 
correct, I'll give the group some lollies -
but that's only if you all do so well that 
the number of equations you get correct as a 
group is more than the number I expect you to. 
The children were then given either set A or set 
B of equations to solve. In five minutes they were 
told to stop work and their papers were collected. 
The instructions for the other orientation were then 
given and a similar procedure, using the alternative 
set of equations, was followed. The first set of 
equations the children solved was marked while they 
were solving the second set and they were given the 
results after they had finished the second set. The 
second set was marked quickly while the children 
waited and they were then told the results. The 
subjects were then questioned to see if the two sets 
of instructions had been successful in establishing 
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the cooperative and competitive orientations inten­
ded. This questioning was not very success ful as 
it was difficult to convey to the children what was 
meant by the question without being too explicit and 
divulging the hoped-for answer. The answers of  
approximately half the groups suggested that the 
instructions had succeeded but it is doubtful as to 
whether the children really understood what was 
being asked as there was a tendency to agree with 
whatever the experimenter said. On the other hand, 
it is not certain that the instructions were not 
success ful in the other half o f  the cases, as their 
responses similarly could have been - and at times 
seemed to be - due to a lack of understanding o f  the 
nature of  the question. However, in view of  the 
doubt surrounding the success of  the instructions, 
it can not be assumed that the two orientations were 
success fully established and the results o f  this 
part o f  the experiment are therefore not a good in­
dication of performance under cooperative and compe­
titive conditions. 
In the cooperative condition, all subjects were 
rewarded for achievement of  the group ' s  goal, each 
individual in the group receiving the same reward, 
whereas in the competitive condition only one member 
of the group received a reward. 
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All the groups within a school were tested one 
after the other - this meant that the time required 
for this section of the experiment was minimised and 
the children, who were all asked not to tell others 
about what they had been doing, had less time in which 
to keep quiet about the experiment, a task which was 
expected to be somewhat difficult for the children. 
In the PDG the subjects sat one at each end of 
a table which was divided in half by the screen. 
After the subjects were settled in pairs the follow-
ing instructions were read out: 
I want you to sit down here at this table -
you can sit here and you can sit here. Right. 
Now, you both know which is your right hand 
and which is your left hand, don't you? Show 
me which is your right hand - that's it (cor-
rected if necessary) - and now show me which 
is your left hand - that's it. Good. Just 
in case you can't remember, I'll put a red 
spot on your right hand and a blue one on 
your left hand. Like this - a red one on 
your right hand and a blue one on your left 
hand, and a red spot on your right hand and 
a blue one on your left hand. Now, each of 
you has a plate in front of you with some 
counters in it - you both have the same 
number of counters. The idea of this game 
is that you can lose some of those counters 
or get some more by raising your right or 
left hand - you can only put up one hand at 
a time. When I ring this bell, I want you 
both to put up one of your hands - remember, 
only one of your hands. ++If you both put up 
your left hand - the hand with the blue spot 
on it - then you each get one extra counter, 
but if you both put up your right hand - the 
red spot - then I'll take one counter away 
from each of you. If  one of you put up 
your right hand and the other puts up his left 
hand, then I will take two counters away from 
the person who puts up his left hand and give 
them to the other person - that is, the one 
who puts up his right hand. Do you understand 
that? Just in case you don't I'll explain it 
again. (The instructions were then repeated 
from ++. ) OK? At the end of the game I'll 
count up the number of counters you have in 
the plate in front of you and for each two 
counters you have I'll give you one lolly -
for each two (two fingers were held up) coun­
ters you have I'll give you one (one finger 
was held up) lolly. All right? Remember, 
you can only put up one hand at a time. 
For each trial of the PDG the subjects were told 
which hand each subject had put up and for the first 
ten trials were asked alternately what should be done -
that is, who should get counters and how many. It 
was thus possible to check that the subjects under-
stood the nature of the game. There were several 
dyads where either one or both subjects were unable 
to comprehend the consequences of their raising their 
right or left hand and whose responses therefore 
could not be regarded as indicating a cooperative or 
a non-cooperative tendency - these dyads were elimi-
nated from the results. 
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Another elimination criterion that was adopted 
was that of 50 responses where both subjects raised 
their left hands. In this situation the subjects 
did not experience a response where one subject co­
operated and the other defected and therefore were 
not necessarily aware that in the latter situation 
the subject who defected gained more than when both 
subjects cooperated. As the possibilities of the 
game situation were not necessarily clear to these 
subjects, these dyads were eliminated - one European 
homogeneous dyad was eliminated from the statistical 
analysis for this reason. 
Following the conclusion of the game, the number 
of counters each subject had left was established and 
the subjects were requested to refrain from telling 
anyone else what they had been doing. As in the 
performance section of the experiment, it was not 
expected that the subjects would all manage to keep 
quiet about what they had been doing but it was hoped 
that, as the performance section of the experiment 
took at the most one and a half days per school and 
the PDG section took about two days per school, the 
number of children being informed of the nature of 
the experiment before they participated would be small. 
Some children did tell their friends about the experi­
mental situation but it is not known how many of the 
subjects had prior knowledge of the experimental 
tasks. The information that a specific child had 
told his friends was mainly given by children who 
had previously participated in the experimental task, 
possibly at the same time as the child who had told 
his friends, and who were pointing out that although 
someone else had not kept quiet they themselves had 
not told anyone. 
Statistical analysis 
To analyse the performance under cooperative 
and competitive conditions, the scores of each sub­
ject under each of the two conditions was obtained. 
A normal distribution was assumed and a parametric 
statistical test was therefore appropriate, and a 
2 x 2 x 2 (ethnic origin x group composition x orien­
tation) analysis of variance with repeated measures 
on the last factor was applied to the data. 
For the analysis of results obtained from the 
PDG, the assumption of a normal distribution was also 
made and a parametric test - in this case the t test 
was again appropriate. The number of cooperative 
(left-handed) responses was calculated for Maori and 
European groups and a t  test for uncorrelated means 
was applied to the number of cooperative responses 
exhibited over 50 trials and also the number of co­
operative responses over the last 25 trials, as it 
was expected that the response pattern would not 
become established until the latter half of the 
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game. The Maori dyads and the European dyads were 
compared. 
Individual cooperative indices for 50 trials and 
for the last 25 trials were also calculated and the 
performance of Maori children in the homogeneous dyads 
was compared with that of the Maori children in the 
mixed dyads. Similarly, the performance of European 
children in homogeneous dyads was compared with that 
of European children in mixed dyads. Again, t tests 
for uncorrelated means were applied to the data to 
test for differences in performance between the various 
groups. 
The other type of cooperative response, which 
has been mentioned previously (p. 3 7) and exists where 
a subject follows a defecting response by his partner 
on the previous trial with a cooperative response, 
was also calculated for dyads and for individuals and 
a series of t tests for uncorrelated means was applied 
to the data. The same comparisons were made as in 
the case of the more straightforward cooperative res­
ponses where the number of left-handed responses re­
gardless of the subject's partner's previous behaviour 
were calculated. 
An additional method used to analyse the results 
obtained from the PDG was taken from Sibley, Senn, 
and Epanchin's (1 968) study in which they looked at 
the percentage of trials falling into the four 
dyadic outcome possibilities - cooperation­
cooperation, cooperation-defection, defection­
cooperation, and defection-defection - for each of 
the subgroups in their experiment. In this study 
the cooperation-defection and defection-cooperation 
possibilities were classed together. This section 
of the analysis was not conducted to investigate 
any particular hypothesis - rather, the aim was merely 
to see if any additional information could be obtained. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
An analysis of variance was applied to the 
results obtained from the measurement of performance 
under cooperative and competitive conditions . As 
can be seen from Table 5, which gives the results of 
the analysis, only the ethnic origin of the subjects 
showed a significant effect (p < . 001 ) ,  the European 
children solving a significantly greater number of 
subtraction equations correctly than the Maori child­
ren. The lack of significant interaction between 
factors A and C in the analysis of variance table 
(ethnic origin and the condition under which the 
subjects worked, cooperation or competition) confirms 
the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 2 - that is, the 
Maori children did not solve a significantly greater 
number of equations correctly in a cooperative social 
situation as opposed to a competitive social situa­
tion than did the European children. 
Hypothesis 1 is not tested directly by any one 
value in Table 5. However the lack of significant 
difference between the performances of all subjects -
both Maori and European - under the two induced social 
situations, and the lack of significant interaction 
Table 5. Analysis of Variance Table for 
the Performance of Subjects in 
Cooperative and Competitive Social 
Situations 
Source of 
SS df MS F variation 
Between subjs 22043. 73 207 
A (ethnic origin 707. 77 1 707.77 17. 84* 
of subjects) 
B (group compo- 24. 21 1 24. 21 0.61 
sition) 
AB 2. 50 1 2. 50 
Subj w. groups 8092. 91 204 39.67 
(error (bet)) 
Within Subjs 646. 5 208 
c (condition) 1 . 42 1 1 . 42 o. 45 
AC 3. 16 1 3. 16 1.01  
BC 3. 59 1 3. 59 1 . 1 4 
ABC 1. 72 1 1 .72 0. 55 
c x subj w. groups 639. 82 204 3. 1 4  
(error (within)) 
* p  < 0. 001 
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between ethnic origin and the social situation in­
duced by the instructions indicate that the two 
social situations did not differentially affect the 
performances of subjects when the results obtained 
from the entire sample, including both Maori and 
European subjects, were considered, and that the 
effect upon performance of working in a cooperative 
social situation as compared to a competitive social 
situation did not differ between the two ethnic groups. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1, that Maori children will 
perform significantly better in a cooperative social 
situation than in a competitive social situation, 
was rejected. The lack of difference between the 
two ethnic groups implies that the lack of difference 
between performance under cooperative and competitive 
social situations applies to both the European and 
the Maori subjects when they are considered separately. 
The only other way in which the effect upon performance 
of a cooperative and a competitive social situation 
could be nonsignificant is if the Maori subjects 
showed an improved performance under one type of 
social situation and the European subjects showed an 
improvement under the other type of social situation. 
In this case, the differences occuring in the two 
ethnic groups would cancel each other out and the 
analysis would therefore reveal no difference between 
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the two conditions over the entire sample. This 
latter situation is not the case, however, as the 
analysis shows that there is no significant differ-
ence between the performance of the two ethnic groups 
under the two conditions of cooperation and competi-
tion. The decision to reject Hypothesis 1 is also 
based upon the results of an a priori t test applied 
to the data. This t test compared the performance 
of the Maori subjects in the cooperative and the com-
petitive working situations. The obtained value of 
t failed to reach significance (see Table 6) . 
Hypothesis 3 
To test Hypothesis 3, that Maori children will 
exhibit a significantly greater level of cooperative 
behaviour than European children, the cooperative 
Table 6. Mean Performance Scores of Maori 
Children in Cooperative and Com-
petitive Social Situations 
Mean 
Cooperation 
Competition 
9. 17 
8.91 
t = 0. 71 n. s. 
(Ferguson, 1966, p. 296) 
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responses of the Maori dyads and the European dyads 
were compared. Four 1-tailed t tests were performed -
two comparing the number of cooperative responses ex-
hibited by the Maori dyads and the European dyads 
over 50 trials and over the last 25 trials, and two 
comparing the number of cooperative-following-defection 
responses by the Maori dyads and the European dyads 
over 50 trials and over the last 25 trials. 
Figures 1 and 2 are graphical representations 
of the number of cooperative responses exhibited by 
the dyads over 50 trials in 5-trial blocks. As 
can be seen from Figure 1, the Maori dyads, instead 
of showing more cooperation than the European dyads 
as predicted, actually showed less cooperation. From 
Tables 7 and 8, which give the results of the t tests 
Table 7. 
Maori dyads 
European dyads 
Table 8. 
Maori dyads 
European dyads 
Mean Number of Cooperative Responses 
over 50 Trials of the PDG by Dyads 
Mean S.D. 
23. 64 
33. 00 
18. 96 
11. 48 
t = -1. 41 n. s. 
Mean Number of Cooperative Responses 
over the Last 25 Trials of the PDG 
by Dyads 
Mean S. D. 
8. 45 8. 33 t = -1. 91 
14. 59 7. 33 
0. 10 > p > 0 . 05 
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applied to the data, it can be seen that the differ­
ences between the cooperative behaviour of the Maori 
and the European dyads failed to reach significance 
when either all 50 trials of the PDG were included 
in the analysis or only the cooperative behaviour on 
the last 25 trials was considered, although there is 
a nonsignificant trend for the European dyads to ex­
hibit more cooperative behaviour than the Maori 
dyads over the last 25 trials of the game. 
Figure 2 shows that, in the case of the coop-
erative-following-defection responses, there was a 
slight difference from the pattern of responding 
when all cooperative responses were included in the 
analysis in that for the first twenty trials the 
Maori dyads exhibited a slightly greater number of 
cooperative-following-defection responses than the 
European dyads. However , this difference did not 
continue over the entire game. Neither of the t 
tests applied to the data for cooperative-following­
defection responses yielded a t  value that approached 
significance (the results are given in Tables 9 and 
Table 9. 
Maori dyads 
European dyads 
Mean Number of Cooperative-following­
defection Responses over 50 trials of 
the PDG by Dyads 
Mean S. D. 
10. 59 
5. 17 
t = -0. 55 n. s. 
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1 0.) Comparison of the position of the Maori dyads 
relative to that of the European dyads in Figures 1 
and 2 and comparison of the mean number of coopera­
tive and cooperative-following-defection responses 
by the dyads, given in Tables 7 and 9, shows that al­
though the Maori dyads are still less cooperative 
than the European dyads when cooperation is measured 
by cooperative-following-defection responses (Maori 
dyads, X = 1 7. 27; European dyads, X = 1 9. 24) , the 
difference is less than when the total numbers of 
cooperative responses are compared (Maori dyads, 
X = 23. 64; European dyads, X = 33. 00) . Although 
the difference between the Maori and the European 
dyads in the total number of cooperative responses 
exhibited approaches significance for the last 25 
trials of the game (Table 8) this difference de­
creases when the cooperative-following-defection 
Table 10. 
Maori dyads 
European dyads 
Mean Number of Cooperative-following­
defection Responses over the Last 25 
Trials of the PDG by Dyads 
Mean S. D. 
6. 64 
9. 1 2  
6. 1 8  
3. 1 8  
t = -1. 1 8  n. s. 
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responses over the last 25 trials of the game are 
considered (Table 10 ) ,  the difference in the latter 
not even approaching the 0. 05 significance level. 
Thus, although there is a trend approaching 
significance for the Maori dyads to be less, rather 
than more, cooperative than the European dyads when 
the total cooperative responses for the last 25 trials 
are compared, no similar trend in support of this is 
found when the number of cooperative-following-defection 
responses exhibited over the last 25 trials is con­
sidered. It is therefore concluded that although 
the Maori dyads do not exhibit a greater amount of 
cooperative behaviour than the European dyads, as was 
expected, neither do they show less cooperative be-
haviour. That is, there is no difference in the 
amount of cooperative behaviour exhibited by homogeneous 
dyads of the two ethnic groups. 
In  the case of the ethnically heterogeneous 
dyads, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that for both types 
of cooperative responses the amount of cooperation 
exhibited by the heterogeneous dyads, as was antici­
pated, is less than that exhibited by the European 
dyads but more than that exhibited by the Maori 
dyads - that is, a compromise position was reached. 
The finding that the Maori dyads did not show a greater 
amount of cooperative behaviour than the European dyads 
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as was expected affects Hypotheses 4 and 5 in that 
the expected effects of participation in an ethni­
cally mixed dyad as opposed to an ethnically homo­
geneous dyad, determined on the basis of the situation 
in the PDG, are now reversed. That is, Hypotheses 4 
and 5 are not supported as they stand. However, it 
is worth while altering them in the light of the 
results relating to Hypothesis 3 and investigating 
the amended hypotheses. Hypothesis 4 now predicts 
that the Maori children in ethnically heterogeneous 
dyads will give a significantly greater number of 
cooperative responses in the PDG than Maori children 
in ethnically homogeneous dyads. Similarly, Hypothesis 
5 now predicts that the European children in mixed 
dyads will give a significantly lower number of co­
operative responses in the PDG than European children 
in ethnically homogeneous dyads. 
Hypothesis 4 
Figure 3 shows that, as the revised version of 
Hypothesis 4 predicts, there is a tendency for 
Maori children in ethnically mixed dyads to be 
more cooperative, as measured by the total number 
of cooperative responses given, than Maori children 
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in ethnically homogeneous dyads. However, Tables 11 
and 12 show that this difference does not reach a sig-
nificant level when either the 50 trials of the PDG 
or the behaviour exhibited over the last 25 trials are 
considered. Figure 4 shows that a similar trend 
exists when cooperative-following-defection responses 
are considered, but again the difference does not 
Table 11. Mean Number of Cooperative Responses 
over 50 Trials of the PDG by Maori 
Children 
Mean s. D. 
Homogeneous dyads 11. 82 t = -1. 18 
Mixed dyads 
Table 12. 
0 .  25 > p > 0 .  10 
Mean Number of Cooperative Responses 
over the Last 25 Trials of the PDG 
by Maori Children 
Mean S. D. 
Homogeneous dyads 4. 23 
6.38 
t = -1. 21 
Mixed dyads 0. 25 > p > 0. 10 
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approach significance (Tables 1 3  and 1 4) .  
Hypothesis 5 
Figure 3 indicates that, as predicted by 
the revised version of Hypothesis 5, the Euro­
pean children in ethnically mixed dyads exhibited 
a smaller number of cooperative responses than 
Table 1 3. Mean Number of Cooperative-following­
defection Responses over 50 Trials of 
the PDG by Maori Children 
Mean S. D. 
Homogeneous dyads 8. 64 6. 23 
5. 93 Mixed dyads 
Table 1 4. 
t = -0. 86 n. s. 
1 0. 46 
Mean Number of Cooperative-following­
defection Responses over the Last 25 
Trials of the PDG by Maori Children 
Mean S. D. 
Homogeneous dyads 3.32 
4. 77 
3.52 
t = -1 . 05 n. s. 
Mixed dyads 4 . oo 
European children in homogeneous dyads. However, as 
Tables 15 and 16 show, this small but consistent differ­
ence does not reach significance when either the 50 
trials of the PDG or the last 25 trials are considered. 
This predicted difference is also apparent when the 
cooperative-following-defection responses of Europeans 
in homogeneous and mixed dyads are compared (Figure 4) 
but again this difference does not reach significance 
Table 15 Mean Number of Cooperative Responses 
over 50 Trials of the PDG by European 
Children 
Mean S. D. 
Homogeneous dyads 
Mixed dyads 
6. 45 
7. 88 
t = 1. 26 
0. 25 > p > 0. 10 
Table 16. Mean Number of Cooperative Responses 
over the Last 25 Trials of the PDG 
by European Children 
Mean S. D. 
Homogeneous dyads 
Mixed dyads 
4. 15 
4. 45 
t = 1. 19 
0. 25 > p > 0. 10 
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and although the difference approaches significance 
when the behaviour of the two groups over the 50 trials 
of the PDG is compared (Table 1 7) the difference de­
creases and does not even approach significance when 
the behaviour of the dyads over the last 25 trials of 
the PDG is considered (Table 18).  
Thus, although Hypotheses 4 and 5 were not suppor­
ted in their original form, there is some degree of 
support, although very slight and nonsignificant, in 
their revised forms. 
Table 1 7. Mean Number of Cooperative-following­
defection Responses over 50 Trials of 
the PDG by European Children 
Mean S. D. 
Homogeneous dyads 
Mixed dyads 
t = 1 . 80 
0. 1 0  > p > 0. 05 
Table 1 8. Mean Number of Cooperative-following­
defection Responses over the Last 25 
Trials of the PDG by European Children 
Mean S. D. 
Homogeneous dyads 
Mixed dyads 
t = 1 . 26 
0. 25 > p > 0. 1 0  
---------------- � ------ - -- - -· -
Distribution of outcome possibilities 
Another method of analysing results from the PDG, 
mentioned in Chapter 3 (p.4 7) , is that used by Sibley, 
Senn and Epanchin (1968). Table 19 contains the per­
centage of trials for each dyadic subgroup falling 
into the three outcome possibilities and shows that, 
again, the ethnically heterogeneous dyads appear to 
reach a compromise position, the proportions of each 
type of response for these dyads being approximately 
mid-way between the proportions of the response types 
exhibited by the two groups of homogeneous dyads. 
The Maori and the European dyads made a similar per­
centage of cooperative-cooperative dyadic responses. 
The difference between the two groups emerges when the 
percentages of defection-defection and cooperation­
defection responses are compared - the European dyads 
Table 19. 
Dyad 
European 
Maori 
Heterogeneous 
Percentage of Responses in Each Type 
of Outcome Possibility by Dyads 
cc 
12.94 
10.54 
11. 99 
DD 
46. 35 
63. 08 
54. 93 
CD/DC 
40.59 
26. 36 
33. 08 
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made an approximately equal number of defection-defection 
responses and cooperation-defection responses but the 
Maori dyads made twice as many defection-defection responses 
as cooperation-defection responses. This suggests that 
the subjects in the Maori homogeneous dyads, while not 
significantly less likely than the subjects in the Euro­
pean homogeneous dyads to give cooperation-cooperation 
responses, showed a greater tendency to give defection­
defection responses in preference to cooperation-defection 
responses than the European dyads - that is, the sub-
jects in the Maori homogeneous dyads were less likely to 
persist with cooperative responses when their partner 
was not responding cooperatively than were the European 
subjects in homogeneous dyads . 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of the present study indicate that 
the Maori middle-years child is neither more coopera­
tively oriented than the European middle-years child, 
as measured by game-playing behaviour on the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game, nor performs better than the European ).,./" 
child in a cooperative social situation as opposed 
to a competitive social situation. These results 
are surprising in view of the differences in the 
child rearing practices of the two ethnic groups out­
lined in Chapter 1. However, it is possible that 
differences between the two ethnic groups do exist 
but that the design of the present study was not 
adequate enough to show up these differences. 
The section of the study designed to investigate 
performance in cooperative and competitive social 
situations, for example, was inadequate because, as 
has been mentioned in Chapter 3 (p.41 ) ,  it is doubt­
ful whether the instructions succeeded in establish­
ing cooperative and competitive orientations in the 
subjects. The lack of a significant difference, in 
any direction, between the performance under coopera­
tive and competitive conditions in the sample overall 
could be because the two conditions do not affect 
68. 
performance differently - the findings of previous 
studies in this area have not provided any definite 
answer to the question of whether cooperative and 
competitive social situations affect performance 
differently. Deutsch (1 951) and Haines and McKeachie 
(1 957), for example, found that while group produc­
tivity, measured in an educational setting in both 
studies, was increased when the groups were working 
under a cooperative grading system compared to their 
performance when they were working under a competi­
tive grading system, the performance of the individ­
uals in the groups did not differ significantly 
between the two grading systems. However, the 
questioning of the subjects following the completion 
of this section of the experiment did not clearly 
indicate that the instructions had successfully 
established the desired orientations. It did not 
succeed in revealing the way the subjects actually 
viewed the situations - whether they felt that they 
were all working together as a group in the coopera­
tive situation or that they were trying to do better 
than the others in the group in the competitive situa-
tion. Therefore the results of this portion of this 
study are not acceptable as evidence that Maori child­
ren do not perform better in a cooperative situation 
in comparison to a competitive situation, and that 
the performance of Maori children does not show an 
improvement in a cooperative social situation as 
compared to a competitive social situation that is 
greater than that shown by the European children. 
As no definite conclusions about the performance of 
Maori children in cooperative and competitive social 
situations can be made from the present results, 
more information from other studies investigating 
this aspect is required before any decisions can be 
made about the effect of cooperative and competitive 
working conditions upon performance. However, the 
present results do suggest that there are no differ­
ences between the performances of Maori and European 
children in cooperative and competitive working situa­
tions and that the differences in the achievement 
motivation of the two ethnic groups, proposed by some 
writers (Earle, 1 958, Beaglehole and Ritchie, 1 958) 
therefore do not exist. Earle (1 958) suggests that 
the Maori child limits his achievement to levels that 
are acceptable to his peer group and there is consequently 
no strong drive for personal achievement. The expected 
effect of this is that the Maori child is inhibited 
in a competitive situation and his performance should 
therefore be better in a cooperative situation where 
personal achievement is not involved. The European, on 
the other hand, is freer to compete than the Maori child 
and a cooperative working situation is not expected to 
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improve the performance of the European as much as 
that of the Maori, if at all. However, the present 
results suggest that this is not the case and that 
there are no differences in the achievement motiva-
tion of the two ethnic groups. 
The information on level of cooperative behaviour 
obtained from the Prisoner's Dilemma Game section of 
the experiment showed that the Maori middle-years 
child's greater dependency on his peer groups in com­
parison to that of the middle-years European child who 
is, unlike the Maori child, still closely involved with 
his family, did not have the anticipated effect on the 
level of cooperative behaviour exhibited by the Maori 
child as compared to that of the European child. It 
is important to note that although the Maori children 
were not more cooperative than the European children, 
neither were they less cooperative. There was no 
difference in the amount of cooperative behaviour 
displayed by the two ethnic groups. The failure of 
the Maori children to behave as hypothesised and 
choose to make cooperative responses more frequently 
than the European children when presented with a 
choice between cooperative and noncooperative 
behaviour concurs with Jane Ritchie's (1957, p. 130) 
observation that when the Maori children in her sample 
were given sweets after they had participated in the 
experiment, the children , instead of sharing their 
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sweets with their friends, were very active in keeping 
their sweets for themselves and preventing the other 
children from having them. 
These results do not necessarily mean that the 
peer group dependency of the Maori middle-years 
child never affects the Maori child in such a way as 
to produce greater cooperation by the Maori child 
than is exhibited by the European middle-years child 
in the same situation. It is possible that although 
the Maori children will choose to act noncooperatively 
if given the opportunity, this choice is not always 
available to them. Pressure from the child's peer 
group, to which the Maori child is said to be more 
vulnerable than the European child because of the 
farmer's greater dependency upon the peer group for 
security, may only be exerted in a demand for coopera­
tive behaviour in certain situations - in situations 
relevant to the group life, for example. The Maori 
child is therefore possibly more likely to behave 
cooperatively in response to group pressure in a 
situation relevant to the group life than is the 
European child who does not depend upon his peers 
for approval and security to the same extent. 
The task employed in the present study to 
measure the amount of cooperation exhibited by the 
two ethnic groups - the Prisoner's Dilemma Game - was 
possibly not of sufficient relevance to the subjects 
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to constitute a situation in which peer approval was 
affected by the subject's behaviour in the game. 
The subjects may not have considered the situation 
to be in any way related to the activities of their 
groups and, therefore, not viewed their behaviour in 
the game situation as affecting their standing in 
their peer group. Also, as the subjects were selec-
ted and paired randomly, the subjects were not neces­
sarily paired with someone who was in the same gang 
as themselves - this applies to both the Maori and 
the European dyads, of course. The possible signi-
ficance of this is that the situation involved - the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game situation itself and the 
subject's partner - may have been largely irrelevant 
to the subjects and the Maori child's greater need 
for peer group approval may not have had any influence 
on the subjects ' behaviour. The expected cooperative-
ness of the Maori may, for the age group considered 
in this study, be limited to the child ' s  immediate 
gang associates and then only in situations relevant 
to the gang life. 
This suggests that although the Maori children 
did not behave more cooperatively than the European 
children in the present study, they could do so when 
the task involved is in some way relevant to their 
group life so that social pressure from the subject's 
peer group will have an influence on the subject's 
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behaviour. The Maori subjects might also behave 
more cooperatively when they are in the experimental 
situation with other members of their particular 
peer group rather than with children they know only 
slightly. Although the extent to which dyad members 
knew their partners may have been only slight, this 
knowledge was possibly sufficient to divest the game 
situation of much of its ambiguity. The subjects 
may not have been motivated to act in a socially 
approved manner and therefore, in the case of the 
Maori child, to cooperate. Their relationship with 
their partner had already been established and the 
Maori subjects consequently felt freer to behave non­
cooperatively than if they had been paired with some-
one they did not know previously. The experimental 
situation in the latter case would be the first 
opportunity they had had to establish a relationship 
and the subjects would be uncertain as to how to be-
have in relation to their partner. In this ambiguous 
situation the social bias to cooperate, which is said 
to be a characteristic of Maori culture, might be ob­
served. 
Thus, although the results of the present study 
show that there is no difference in the general amount 
of cooperative behaviour exhibited by Maori and Euro­
pean children, it is possible that there are certain 
situations where differences in the level of coopera-
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tion of the two ethnic groups do exist. Nevertheless, 
the major finding of the present study is that, contrary 
to expectations, Maori children do not in general ex­
hibit a higher level of cooperation than European child­
ren of the same age. 
The findings of this study regarding the level 
of cooperative behaviour displayed by subjects in 
ethnically homogeneous and ethnically mixed dyads 
supports the idea that when representatives of two 
groups differing in some characteristic mix on the 
basis of that characteristic, then a compromise 
position is reached. The change in the level of co­
operative behaviour from a homogeneous dyad to a 
heterogeneous dyad was not significant for either 
the Maori or the European subjects but this was a 
function of the lack of significant difference between 
the levels of cooperative behaviour exhibited by the 
Maori and the European homogeneous dyads. If there 
had been a greater difference between the two groups 
of homogeneous dyads, then the compromise position 
reached by the Maori and European members of the 
heterogeneous dyads would probably have been more 
different from the positions of the two types of 
homogeneous dyads and might have been significant. 
The reaching of a compromise position by the mixed 
dyads can be, and has been (p . 27-28) , explained by 
the positively and negatively reinforcing responses 
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of the subject ' s  partner and therefore the finding 
cannot be generalised to all situations involving 
cooperative behaviour by the people involved. 
However, there is some evidence in the present data 
that when Maori and European children are working 
together the initial level of  cooperation of each 
of the two ethnic groups will influence the level of 
cooperation of the other ethnic group in that situa-
tion. I f  there is a great disparity in the amount 
of cooperation shown by Maori and European children 
in some task involving cooperative behaviour, then 
the forming of ethnically heterogeneous groups could 
be used to produce a more even distribution of the 
degree of cooperation shown, if this was considered 
to be desirable. Before these results can be 
generalised, it is necessary that the effect of 
ethnically heterogeneous groups be investigated by 
some task in which the reaching of a compromise 
position is not explainable in terms of the task 
alone, as it is in the case of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game, but can be shown to be due to the fact 
of the members of the two groups working together. 
Examination of the percentage of responses 
falling into each of the outcome possibilities is of 
considerable interest when the percentages of defection­
defection and cooperation-defection/defection-cooperation 
responses made by the Maori and the European dyads are 
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considered. Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game represents a decision to behave noncooperatively 
and protect oneself against possible loss rather 
than behave cooperatively and allow one ' s  partner to 
choose between an outcome of mutual gain or of greater 
gain to the partner at the expense of the cooperator. 
The making of a defecting response can be described 
as a self-protective action intended to minimise one's 
own losses and one's partner ' s  gains. The tendency 
of the Maori dyads to make twice as many defection­
defection responses suggests that the Maori dyads 
were more responsive to the negative reinforcement of 
a cooperation-defection or a defection-cooperation 
response than the European dyads and made the change 
to the "safety" of a defection-defection response, in 
which both subjects lost one counter rather than one 
losing two counters and the other gaining two counters 
as occurred in cooperation-defection and defection­
cooperation responses, more readily than the European 
dyads. The traditional child rearing practices of 
the Maori people, which have been regarded as encour­
aging cooperation among the middle-years children, 
also suggest that the Maoris are more affected by 
social reinforcement than Europeans. The reason for 
this is that the middle-years Maori children are more 
dependent upon their peer group for approval and security 
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than are the European children who still receive 
security from their home environment. The peer group 
is therefore more important to the Maori child than it 
is to the European child and the Maori child consequent­
ly may be more receptive to social reinforcement than 
the European child. The tendency for the Maori child 
to respond more quickly to negative reinforcement in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game supports this suggestion -
the European children were more inclined to persist 
with defection-cooperation and cooperation-defection 
responses. The European dyads made approximately the 
same number of defection-defection and cooperation­
defection/defection-cooperation responses, whereas the 
Maori children made twice as many of the former type 
of dyadic response. Maori children, once punished 
by a partner making a defecting response at the same 
time as they made a cooperative response, were less 
inclined to give cooperative responses in the future. 
Suggestions for future research 
This study leaves the question of the effect 
upon performance of a cooperative social situation 
as opposed to a competitive social situation on the 
Maori child and the European child still in doubt. 
There are two factors which should be considered in 
a further investigation into this matter. An impor-
tant requirement is that the nature of the experimental 
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situation be such that the possibility of children 
failing to view the situation as cooperative or 
competitive be minimised as much as possible. One 
way of achieving this aim is for the experimental 
situation to be of considerable relevance to the 
subjects. Deutsch (1 951) and Haines and McKeachie 
(1967) in their work with American college students, 
for example, manipulated a series of discussion 
sessions held over an entire college term. To 
establish the cooperative grading system, the sub­
jects were told that the performance of the group as 
a whole was graded and all members of the group re­
ceived the same grade and to establish the competi­
tive grading system were told that the members within 
each group were ranked for their performance. This 
situation is not, of course, applicable to the age 
group used in this study, and also, it is difficult 
under these situations to obtain individual perform­
ance scores in the cooperative condition without 
losing the credibility of the situation - to say that 
the experimenter is interested in the group product 
and then to ask for separate work from each individual 
is rather contradictory. Also, Workie's (1 967) re-
commendation that the cooperative situation involve 
no competitive element poses another restriction in 
that, as in the present experiment, the notion of 
simply cooperating in a group gives the situation an 
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unreal aspect as the subjects are accustomed to com­
peting against other groups when working in groups. 
However, the experimental situation might be more 
success fully devised if the task was incorporated in 
the children's usual school programme over some period 
of time. In the present study the children were seen 
only once for, at the most, thirty minutes and the 
task had no relevance to their school work in that 
their performance on the task was not part of their 
school work. These two factors combined to produce 
a situation which was of very little importance and 
relevance to the children. 
The friendship network of the children could 
also be utilised in further work in this area, as the 
effect of working with gang associates and non-gang 
associates upon the performance of Maori and European 
children would be worth investigating. The friend-
ship networks could also be incorporated in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game situation in that the performance 
of Maori and European subjects when partnered by a 
member of the same gang as the subject and when 
partnered by someone who is not a member of the same 
gang as the subject could be investigated and compared. 
This would make it possible to determine whether the 
Maori children do behave more cooperatively toward 
fellow gang-members than do European children toward their 
fellow gang members or whether the Maori children behave 
more cooperatively in a more ambiguous situation. 
, J 
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